Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency

 

What exactly is an armed group? The two words—armed and group—are clear enough
and, when used together, conjure up any manner of mental images. Unshaven men in
Western attire holding dirty rifles with straps of bullets hanging from their shoulders.
Prohibition-era bank robbers standing on the running boards of a Ford Phaeton with
Thompson machine guns tucked under their arms. Wild-eyed horsemen wearing furs
charging across a Mongolian plateau. Somali teenagers hanging from the back of a
speeding truck, hoisting AK-47 assault rifles. Heavily armed men in sunglasses escorting
a political figure from an airplane.
      For our purposes, this edited collection will consider armed groups to include classic
insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas, militias, police agencies, criminal organizations,

war-lords, privatized military organizations, mercenaries, pirates, drug cartels,
apocalyptic religious extremists, orchestrated rioters and mobs, and tribal factions.
With this broad a definition we will need an equally broad set of disciplines with
which to study armed groups. History, political science, anthropology, sociology, theology,
and economics are traditional areas of research. But we will also delve into matters
of ethics, technology, intelligence, education, the law, diplomacy, military science, and
even mythology. The book is divided into five sections:

• History and armed groups,
• Present context and environment,
• Religion as inspiration,
• Thinking differently about armed groups, and
• The shape of things to come.

      With one exception, each of these chapters was written exclusively for this volume.
The contributors, all renowned in their fields and noted for their authorship and influential
opinions, were individually invited to write for this edited collection. Some of the
contributors are best-selling authors. Others are revered academics. Others are frequently
on television and radio news programs. Still others spent decades doing highly
classified work and consider notoriety an anathema. As a result, readers will find this anthology
rich with academic rigor, practitioner experiences, endnotes, and citations for
further research and study. The following is a brief narrative abstract of each chapter.

Cicero, the Roman philosopher and political thinker, said, “Not to know what has been
transacted in former times is to continue always a child.” Therefore, this volume begins
with a section on the history of armed groups. Case studies from the past offer a great
deal when it comes to understanding the nature of armed groups. What are they? Who
are the members? Why do they develop? And why do they disband?
      In his chapter, entitled “Pirates, Vikings, and Teutonic Knights,” Marine colonel and
Naval War College professor Peter T. Underwood examines armed groups from a
standpoint of evolutionary behavior. Underwood defines three basic categories falling
along a spectrum from poorly organized, disjointed bands, to groups structured and motivated
by greed, to highly organized groups led by ideologues. He cleverly demonstrates
the characteristics of each category by looking at historic group attitudes exhibited first
by pirates, who typify profit-driven criminal gangs. Next, Underwood examines Vikings,
who blend a culture of conquest with marauding plunder, and, finally, Teutonic Knights,
who added religious zeal to their otherwise armed might. He concludes that nation-states
bear a measure of responsibility for armed groups, if only through mere tolerance, and
that to remain unchecked, the groupmust remain beneath the level of serious annoyance.
      Accomplished author and Naval War College professor Dr. Paul J. Smith offers a
meticulous study of one of history’s memorable armed groups in “The Italian Red Brigades
(1969–1984): Political Revolution and Threats to the State.” Smith takes a comprehensive
look at the Red Brigades during their formative and most violent years. A classic example
of structure, support, and tactics, the Red Brigades used murder, extortion, and kidnapping
until such time that they caused the public to recoil at the level of violence. Smith

then draws some insightful parallels between Italy’s successful, albeit more-than-15-year,
struggle against the Red Brigades and the global conflict with al-Qaeda.
      Southeast Asia has its own unique history pertaining to armed groups. Eastern Kentucky
University’s Dr. Carole Garrison, chair of the Department of Criminal Justice
and Police Studies, having been a supervisor with the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC), writes about her experiences with the political process in
the shadow of the Khmer Rouge’s murderous violence. “Armed Conflict in Cambodia
and the UN Response” looks at how one introduces UN standards for peacekeeping and
fair elections when there is no history of it. What are some of the competing agendas
when internationalists cannot agree on their own aspirations and values?
      In close geographic proximity to Cambodia, Indonesia is the setting for the State Department’s
Ambassador Gene Christy’s chapter, “Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East
Timor’s FRETILIN Guerrillas.” As a midlevel State Department foreign service officer,
Christy was a pioneer in using the tools of diplomacy to deal with a violent armed group.
Two decades later, Christy writes about how a guerrilla movement transitioned to be a
legitimate voice of opposition, and then became the elected government. His firsthand
account, which includes plunging helicopter rides and frighteningly close calls with ambushes,
offers a window into the courageous work of foreign-service professionals who
leverage diplomacy in the front lines with armed groups.
      Another hallmark armed group is the subject of Naval War College professor Dr.
Timothy D. Hoyt’s chapter, “Adapting to a Changing Environment—The Irish Republican
Army as an Armed Group.” Hoyt provides an illuminating look at the IRA from a
standpoint of evidencing how changing factors on the ground hastened transformation
within the organization. In particular, Hoyt argues that at different times, depending on
shifting objectives, the IRA behaved as an armed-group chameleon becoming a guerrilla
outfit, a classic insurgency, a terrorist organization, a militia, a police agency, a criminal organization,
a mercenary organization, and finally orchestrated rioters and mobs. Hoyt
warns that focusing exclusively on group methodology may confuse rather than clarify the
situation—better to concentrate on the group objective instead of the form or function.
      RetiredMarine colonel and NavalWar College professor Theodore L. Gatchel escorts
us into the world of fighting insurgents in his chapter, “Pseudo Operations—A Double-Edged
Sword of Counterinsurgency.” A pseudo operation, Gatchel tells us, is where specially
trained and equipped military forces use disguise and subterfuge to infiltrate into an
armed group to capture or kill insurgent leaders and conduct psychological operations
against them. Like ruses as tactics of war, pseudo operations have been very successful
against armed groups. Gatchel offers three electrifying examples where these sorts of
strategies tipped the scales in favor of the authorities who wrested control from armed
groups in the Philippines, Kenya, and Rhodesia. Yet the use of such tactics may have negative
consequences and this chapter explores all sides of the issue.

The news is full of stories about armed violence. No nation is free from some level of
armed brutality and bloodshed. This section is intended to clarify some of the driving
factors that animate the challenges of armed groups today.

      Perhaps one of the most respected researchers and authors on al-Qaeda and global
terrorism is Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, head of the International Centre for Political Violence
and Terrorism Research in Singapore. So widely accepted are his expert credentials
that the U.S. Department of Justice sought his testimony in the successful 2007 prosecution
of Jose Padilla and codefendants Adham Hassoun and Kifah Jayyousi, all convicted
on charges of terrorist conspiracy. In his chapter entitled “The Threat to the Maritime
Domain: How Real Is the Terrorist Threat?” Gunaratna explores the operational aspects
of armed groups that operate on land and at sea. He concludes thatmaritime terrorist capabilities
are actually an extension of land capabilities and, as such, maritime police and
navies are limited in their responses to piracy. Instead, according to Gunaratna, preventing
future maritime attacks can be done much more effectively by law enforcement and
intelligence services operating on land. His three-part strategy calls for (1) creating
land-based maritime conterterrorist commands, presumably with strong naval
investigative and intelligence resources; (2) focusing on securing waters where terrorists
and criminal groups are most active; and (3) protecting ships transporting strategic cargo
such as oil and natural gas.
      Attorney, legal scholar, and University of Washington professor, Craig H. Allen
writes the quintessential legal chapter, appropriately entitled “Armed Groups and the
Law.” In it, Allen helps the reader wade through the myriad of conventions, treaties, customs,
statutes, and principles that make up the essence of decisions we call international
law. Allen reflectively says that strategies and policies to deal with armed groups have
raced ahead of legal regime but we’ve reached a tipping point where the law will have to
be given as much attention for solutions to emerge. Allen poses three legal issues that he
thinks the reader should evaluate. First, to what extent should members of armed groups
be killed by armed forces of a state without prior due process? Next, what are the standards
applicable to their capture, interrogation, treatment and release? Finally, what is
their criminal liability under the law of war or criminal laws typically applied in peacetime?
His chapter provides a comprehensive foundation to find the answers.
      Globalization touches every aspect of the twenty-first-century landscape and armed
groups are no exception. National Defense University’s Dr. Querine H. Hanlon investigates
how globalization enables the transformation of armed groups and how this conversion
will define future security. Her chapter, “Globalization and the Transformation
of Armed Groups,” first introduces four variants of globalization: economic, technological,
cultural, and political. She then discerns how nonstate armed groups have been able
to exploit each of these variants as enablers for transformation and, in so doing, emerge
as global actors with the ability to threaten state sovereignty. Hanlon posits that globalization
makes strong states stronger, while weakening lesser states. This enables armed
groups to take advantage of governance made more vulnerable.
      The cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States gave rise to theories
such as mutually assured destruction, aptly abbreviated as MAD. Each side knew a nuclear
exchange would lead to its own destruction and therefore was deterred from ever
striking first. But retired Israeli brigadier general Yosef Kuperwasser asks us to consider
the question posed by his chapter’s title: “Is It Possible to Deter Armed Groups?”
Given the changing political and operational landscapes, can armed groups be expected

to behave the way the superpowers did? Kuperwasser challenges the concept of strategic
deterrence in today’s world of stateless actors, international terror organizations, and
armed groups. In particular, he highlights the values held sacrosanct by liberal democracies
as weaknesses when viewed by their enemies—such factors as the sanctity of life
(citizens and soldiers); the importance of government truth, accountability, sovereignty,
and transparency; the role of the media. These factors paralyze democracies when faced
with unfettered terror organizations with no such moral or political limitations on how
they behave. This, Kuperwasser argues, frames the dilemma of how to deter an adversary
who operates with different factors than do liberal democracies. However, factors favorable
to armed groups can be held at risk by democracies. Armed groups need credibility
in the eyes of their constituencies, they need use of sanctuary, they need a way to avoid
accountability, they need protection for leaders, they need patron support, and armed
groups need sources of weapons and supplies. Successful deterrence will ultimately require
democracies to aggressively attack armed groups where they are most vulnerable.
      T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) described rebels as requiring “an unassailable
base, something guarded not merely from attack but from the fear of it.” Sanctuary is a
termthat refers to such a safe haven. Retired Marine colonel, esteemed author, and Naval
War College professor Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens provides a wonderful analysis
and elaboration in his chapter, “Sanctuary: The Geopolitics of Terrorism and Insurgency.”
Starting with an exceptional explanation of classical geopolitics, Owens then
treats the reader to a historic examination, citing strategic thinkers such as Halford
Mackinder, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and Thomas Barnett. Owens’s chapter
is unique in that he deals with the concept of sanctuary on different scales of analysis.
Using size as a determinant, Owens argues there are fundamental forces at work between
the size of territorial sanctuary and the corresponding number of armed-group members.
If true, this would allow for accurate predictions of group growth. The chapter concludes
with two edifying case studies: one from the 1880’s western United States and the
other from 2004 Iraq.
      What might it be like to be the senior American military officer in a multinational
headquarters deployed to Afghanistan where your job is solving regional conflicts that
date back hundreds of years? Army colonel and Marine Corps War College professor
Peter Curry writes about his experiences dealing with Afghan tribal matters in his chapter,
“Small Wars Are Local: Debunking Current Assumptions about Countering Small
Armed Groups.” Candid, informative, and matter-of-fact, Curry shares his experiences
and analysis in a refreshing reevaluation of old assumptions about dealing with local warriors,
and offers new ways of thinking. Curry concludes by observing that armed groups
are living organisms that force one to change strategies and concepts over time. New assumptions
create new mental models that will eventually lead to new strategies and operational
approaches to counter armed groups.
      Pirates have to be some of the most popularly studied armed groups in literature,
film, and history. In a superb chapter entitled “Piracy and the Exploitation of Sanctuary,”
British researcher and prolific author Martin N. Murphy provides an intriguing
comparison of pirates and maritime armed groups for which he offers seven factors
of discrimination. One of his key points is that piracy is a land-based crime that is

implemented at sea. Moreover, intelligence is the best tool against piracy. As a result, solutions
must begin with coordinated enforcement against the terrestrial elements of
planning, recruitment, logistics, and sanctuary.
      Radical Islamic extremism and international armed groups seem to have overshadowed
other forms of organized violence. Yet, at least in the United States, domestic terrorism
and homegrown armed groups must also remain a focus of scrutiny for criminal
and intelligence organizations trying to protect us. Dr. Edward J. Valla and Gregory
Comcowich, both with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, coauthored a brilliant chapter
entitled “Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, But Not Gone.” Long before Osama bin
Laden was born, racist, antigovernment, Christian Identity, revolutionary armed groups
were using improvised explosive devices to kill American judges and federal agents and
bomb military recruiting stations. Throughout the 1960s and ’70s, domestic terrorism
was inflamed by antiwar activists. Today, antigovernment attacks, such as the Oklahoma
City bombing in 1995, abortion clinic bombings, and environmentally driven acts of violence,
remind us that domestic armed groups are still a potent enemy. The reader will be
introduced to the latest threats inside America as well as some misperceptions about relative
risk.
      Those who study inner-city dynamics are keenly aware of gang violence. Graffiti on
walls, buildings, vehicles, and billboards tells a story of turf battles and gang identity for
those who know how to read the symbols. As explained by New York Institute of Technology
professor Dr. Edward J. Maggio in his chapter, “The Threat of Armed Street
Gangs in America,” the current threats to our national security from armed street gangs
are a real and frightening reality. Maggio offers us an inspired scholarly treatment of the
origins of street gangs, with a heavy emphasis on social and psychological behavior patterns.
He explores the concept of delinquency and group dynamics. What’s more,
Maggio explicates a seven-stage hate model from which he shows how street-gang activity
escalates into organized armed groups. His chapter ends with discussion of the Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13) group, perhaps the most dangerous gang in America.
      Steven Emerson is an internationally recognized expert on terrorism and national
security and a best-selling author. Since 9/11, Emerson has testified before and briefed
Congress dozens of times on terrorist financing and operational networks of al-Qaeda,
Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the rest of the worldwide Islamic militant spectrum.
In this chapter, Emerson takes us inside the courtroom of a notable trial involving
an American-born imam of Iraqi descent and an American convert to Islam who had ties
to terrorist groups overseas. “Prosecuting Homegrown Extremists: Case Study of the
Virginia ‘Paintball Jihad’ Cell” is a comprehensive look at the influence that foreign terrorist
organizations wield in the United States. Emerson pulls the curtains back on organizations
such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and other
self-described Islamic civil rights and advocacy groups to reveal their direct associations
with admittedAmerican jihadists and thosewho wish to “wagewar against the United States.”

 

 

It’s difficult for Americans to contemplate that religion and armed-group violence have a
causal relationship. It contradicts everything we believe about sanctity, theology, and

spirituality. Nevertheless, history is replete with religious violence. This section will take a
look at religious factors that define ancient as well as future forms of conflict.
      Marine Corps Command and Staff College’s Dr. Pauletta Otis, one of the most
highly respected academics in the field of religiously fomented violence, provides a
benchmark chapter by which readers can grasp the complexity of armed groups that are
driven by spiritual ideology. “Armed with the Power of Religion: Not Just a War of
Ideas” begins with the assumption that religion contributes to the lethality of armed
groups for which sacred identity provides justification for their fights. Otis proposes that
there are four sources of religious power. Resources such as buildings and congregation
members are one source of power. Interpersonal power, which holds that religious leaders
are often more believable than political leaders, is another. Communication is a source
of power in that religious leaders communicate with the authority of God and the authority
of man. Expertise is the fourth source of power, based on religious figures’ having
intimate knowledge of locale, history, medicine, education, and community
dynamics. Within each of these sources of religious power are elements that leaders and
communities can leverage to manipulate their environments with stunning effectiveness.
The chapter then examines examples of this in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Uganda, Peru,
and Rwanda. Otis concludes that understanding the source of religious power makes it
possible to analyze the human-religious dimension of insurgency, counter the negative
impact of religious factors, and support the positive aspects of religious power to compel
peace.
      How do religious beliefs in America turn into violent actions? U.S. Navy chaplain
Commander Timothy J. Demy answers this question in an authoritative and analytical
assessment of Christian extremists in the United States who have been responsible for
murder, assault, destruction of property, and explosive- and firearms-related crimes.
“Arming for Armageddon: Myths and Motivations of Violence in American Christian
Apocalypticism” examines eschatology, the study of the end-of-times prophecies. Leveraging
his remarkable academic and theological credentials, Demy gives the reader an astonishing
glimpse into the minds of Christian zealots. Moreover, following four
American case studies, Demy concludes with his “Ten Commandments for the cautiously
concerned,” which puts forward practicable solutions.
      When one fights, for whatever purpose, the object of the struggle is to defeat the
opponent. So when Dr. Mehrdad Mozayyan, Islamic intellectual and Naval War
College professor, offers a counterintuitive title such as “Glory in Defeat and Other
Islamist Ideologies,” we are immediately captivated by his thesis. Mozayyan offers a
well-documented and scholarly discussion of the elements of militant Islamic philosophy,
which embrace the willingness to be martyred; to wage war on a larger enemy knowing
full well what the earthly outcomes will be; and to be massacred while defending
Muslim beliefs and, in doing so, ensure ultimate glory and salvation for oneself. The
chapter discerns the schism between Sunni and Shiite foundations, with six main divisions,
and also offers a geopolitical assessment of how the Islamic world perceives the
West. 

 

So far, this edited collection has looked at armed groups in traditional ways. The chapters
in this section purposely examine armed groups from different perspectives based on
scholarly consideration of evidence as well as predictive analysis.
      What might conflict look like without traditional norms of behavior, without respect
for internationally accepted legal regimens, without regard for societal consequences?
Dr. Andrea J. Dew, Naval War College professor and best-selling author, examines two
key questions in her chapter, “The Erosion of Constraints in Armed-Group Warfare:
Bloody Tactics and Vulnerable Targets.” The first question deals with public support for
future conflicts with armed groups when violence and exhaustion become too much to
bear. How will we know when the public says, “Enough is enough?” The second question
uses these indicators of public sentiment and looks for ways that policy makers and military
strategists can plan for such conflicts. Dew then provides a five-part intellectual
framework to analyze constraints and limitations that affect decision making. These are
state cohesiveness, external and transnational actors, the role of ideology, the role of information
technology, and duration of conflict. Dew concludes that the ability of states
to wage warfare can be severely curtailed by lack of support at home for expenditure of
blood and treasure. Moreover, one of the deliberate strategies of armed groups is to escalate
the cost of the conflict by purposely prolonging its duration.
      Dr. James J. F. Forest, prolific writer, author, and director of West Point’s Combating
Terrorism Center, looks at how armed groups pass on know-how and expertise to
other like organizations. “Knowledge Transfer and Shared Learning among Armed
Groups” is an in-depth study of the myriad ways collaboration between and among
groups happens. Using historic examples and future predictions, Forest explains how
armed groups utilize primitive training camps tucked into remote ravines, as well as
Internet chat rooms, to share tradecraft. Forest then introduces a novel construction he
calls a “trusted handshake” whereby associates verify bona fides of others. He concludes
with eight well-considered implications for thinking differently about armed groups.
      Anthropologist, attorney, Pentagon adviser, prolific author, and professor, Dr. Montgomery
McFate presents an exceptional study into the roots of tribal behavior in her
chapter, “The ‘Memory of War’: Tribes and the Legitimate Use of Force in Iraq.” McFate
begins with a discussion into what tribes are and how tribal systems demand different
ways of thinking about them, not just as groups, but as political actors. McFate delves,
based on her own time in the Iraqi theater, into how the history of the region shapes
tribal behavior and attitudes. One of the most insightful portions is her discussion of
what she calls the “algebra of honor,” which ignores the numbers of casualties and, instead,
is calculated on the basis of tribal honor and centuries of tradition. McFate concludes
with an optimistic view that present doctrine, which stresses limited use of force,
minimization of collateral damage, and cultural understanding, is very well suited to the
social complexities of Iraq.
      Dr. Derek S. Reveron of the Naval War College and Professor Jeffrey Stevenson
Murer of the University of St. Andrews collaborate on their chapter, “Terrorist or Freedom
Fighter? Tyrant or Guardian?” As the title suggests, the way we think about armed
groups and sovereign states will define how we deal with them. This chapter is a solid

discussion of political drivers. For example, the authors declare that terrorism is a tactic
employed in a political context and that nation-states create policy connotations to their
benefit by labeling political opponents as terrorists. Furthermore, while terrorism may
threaten democracies, the response from the state may be the greater evil. The authors
offer some historic examples of nation-states that purposely used the specter of national
emergency to pursue political adversaries, thereby giving the government extraordinary
power. They conclude with a warning about the dangers of using war as the context to
look at armed groups.
      Psychologist Dr. ElenaMastors, NavalWar College professor and an accomplished
author on matters of psychology and group behavior, teams with counterintelligence
professional Jeffrey H. Norwitz, Naval War College professor and Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS) special agent, in a fascinating chapter that blends theory and
practical application. “Disrupting and Influencing Leaders of Armed Groups” proposes
a four-step framework for examining the psychological underpinnings of leaders in
which the authors focus on personal characteristics, operating environment, advisory
system, and information environment—the combination of which informs strategies for
influencing behavior and decision-making processes of armed-group leaders. Utilizing
the unmatched ability of human intelligence practitioners to gain access to leaders and
their advisers, often through clandestine and covert action, the authors lay out
step-by-step strategies for manipulating leaders into self-destructive behaviors, thereby
eliminating the group as a nemesis. The chapter is complete with a historic example of
superb human intelligence work as well as a new case study on the personality of Ayman
al-Zawahri.
      The final chapter in this section considers anthropology as a discipline to study
armed groups. Renowned anthropologist, author, and Naval War College professor Dr.
David W. Kriebel views an armed group as a social unit existing within a larger society
subject to the norms of one or more wider cultures. “Armed Groups through the Lens
of Anthropology” is a captivating study of how culture, not biology, is the basis for human
aggression. He presents three “lenses” of anthropology through which to analyze
armed groups. The lens of “kinship” relates to familial dynamics. The lens of “cognitive”
anthropology explores how ordinary people can act in extraordinarily violent inhuman
ways. And the lens of “critical” anthropology eschews a neutral approach to its
subject matter. Taken together, Kriebel states that the use of anthropological insight in
studying armed groups and conflict is beneficial.

“I never think of the future—it comes soon enough.” Albert Einstein’s quintessential
quote about the future is profound and perhaps suggests a measure of wait-and-see. Yet
for the national security practitioner, the risk of inaction is too great. In the concluding section,
we take a look at some of the harbingers of things to come relative to armed groups.
If we fail to shape the future, we will be the beneficiaries of a future designed by others.
      In a ground-breaking and frightening chapter based on his award-winning work and
many published books and essays, Dr. P. W. Singer, senior fellow and director of the
21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution, uncovers the ugly reality

referenced in his chapter’s title: “Children on the Battlefield: The Breakdown of Moral
Norms.” Dr. Singer is considered one of the world’s leading experts on changes in
twenty-first-century warfare. Written exclusively for this volume, this chapter captures a
horrible dilemma for armed forces and police having to deal with armed groups that utilize
child soldiers. Dr. Singer’s most recent book, Children at War (Pantheon, 2005), was
the first book to comprehensively explore the compelling and tragic rise of child-soldier
groups and was recognized by the 2006 Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Book of the Year
Award. His commentary on the issue was featured in a variety of venues ranging from
NPR and Fox News to Defense News and People magazine. Dr. Singer has served as a consultant
on the issue to the U.S. Marine Corps and Congress, and the recommendations in
his book resulted in recent changes in the UN peacekeeping training program.
      One of the worrisome specters of future conflict is where terrorism and organized
crime intersect. “The ‘New Silk Road’ of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Key to
Countering the Terror-Crime Nexus” is a chapter authored by Brigadier General (retired)
Russell D. Howard, director of the Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, and
Colleen M. Traughber, a Jebsen graduate research assistant. Together, they offer the
reader a geostrategic overview of the region from Afghanistan to western Europe that
they call the new Silk Road. This chapter exposes activity across the expanse wherein terrorism,
corruption, and organized crime have found a strategic partnership. Regional
trafficking in drugs, weapons, and human cargo provides a fertile environment for terrorists
to find sanctuary. The authors conclude with a four-step plan: counter the
terror-crime nexus, establish interagency cooperation at the lowest levels, fight a network
with a network, and indentify the level of collusion between terrorists and traffickers and
respond accordingly.
      Perhaps one of the most complex and vexing aspects of understanding armed
groups is in the arena of financing. How do groups sustain themselves? What is the evidence
to suggest state sponsorship? How do members move money for the benefit of individuals
and the organization? What is the role of religion when it comes to money
matters? Written by best-selling author and director of the American Center for Democracy,
Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld, and her assistant Alyssa A. Lappen, these questions and
more are answered in the chapter entitled “Shari’a Financing and the Coming Ummah.”
The authors courageously uncover state and nonstate organizations, as well as business
conspiracies, that keep armed groups and terror organizations funded and therefore operationally
deadly. Dr. Ehrenfeld has an international reputation for exposing governments
and nongovernmental organizations with clandestine economic ties to terror
organizations. Her articles appear in print worldwide and she’s given expert testimony on
television, on radio news programs, and before U.S. courts and Congress. Ehrenfeld and
Lappen craft an irrefutable argument, superbly researched and meticulously documented,
that the West’s reluctance to identify and understand the sharia financial complex
is, by itself, a measure of the enemy’s success.
      The international scope of terrorism and armed groups is brilliantly captured in a paper
presented by Stanford University’s Dr. Martha Crenshaw to the Pontifical Catholic
University of Rio de Janeiro’s Conference on Terrorism and International Relations. In
“Terrorism as an International Security Problem,” Dr. Crenshaw answers five questions:

What is terrorism today? What are its causes? Why is terrorism a threat to international
security? How has the international community responded? What does the future look
like? Instructive, discerning, and visionary, Crenshaw’s chapter is a splendid blend of
astute answers to enduring questions.
      Armed groups have clear objectives. They have identifiable goals. They exist for a
specific purpose. Or do they? Perhaps they don’t aspire to anything but mere anarchy and
disorder? Dr. P. H. Liotta, executive director of the Pell Center for International Relations
and Public Policy, takes his theory of chaos as strategy and expands it with his chapter,
“Takin’ It to the Streets: Hydra Networks, Chaos Strategies, and the ‘New’
Asymmetry.” Referring to U.S. national security decision making as a rational process,
Liotta suggests that there is an inherent vulnerability in this thinking that does not account
for irrational (chaotic) choice by the adversary. He explains the implications for national
security and force planning as well as ways to adapt to chaos where our adversary’s
essential aim is to achieve victory through avoiding defeat. Referring to the mythical,
multiheaded Hydra, and using an adage from India, Liotta reminds us that one way to kill
a tiger is to distract it from so many different sides that it tries to run in every direction at
once. We must adapt to the new asymmetry or else face the fate of the tiger.
      Tufts University’s Dr. Richard Shultz, best-selling author and scholar on national
security matters, writes a chapter entitled “Virtual Sanctuary Enables Global Insurgency.”
In it, he explores how the loss of physical sanctuary was a setback to al-Qaeda and the
Taliban when, in 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
Since then, according to Shultz, two strategic adaptations have occurred. One
is the use of the Internet to establish a virtual sanctuary in cyberspace. The other, leveraging
the first strategic adaptation, is to promote the global Salafi jihad movement. The
chapter looks at seven categories of activities from which a global insurgency has replaced
pre-2001 tactics, techniques, and procedures. They are propagating the Salafi ideology
of jihad, inspiring and mobilizing the ummah to join the jihad, engaging in
psychological warfare to demoralize the enemy, networking the global Salafi jihad insurgency,
sharing manuals and handbooks, sharing training videos and courses, and collecting
information for targeting.
      The final chapter in the section is entitled “Armed Groups: Changing the Rules.”
Written by T. X. Hammes, best-selling author and retired Marine colonel, the chapter
gives the reader an overview of a concept about which Hammes is a pioneer thinker: that
of fourth-generation warfare. Hammes contends that armed groups fall into one of
three categories of motivation: reactionary, opportunistic, or ideological. These categories
are useful to understand how groups organize, grow, and operate. He includes a brief
treatment of private military companies—for example, contractors who mirror small armies
and are hired for protection and bodyguard duties. Hammes concludes by warning
that political, economic, social, and technical trends are increasing the number, variety,
and power of armed groups.

The book is made more complete with the inclusion of Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations
with Armed Groups as an appendix. Produced by the United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, these comprehensive guidelines summarize strategies
and approaches for undertaking humanitarian negotiations with armed groups. As
stated in the guidelines, the primary objectives of humanitarian negotiations are to ensure
assistance and protection to vulnerable populations, preserve humanitarian space,
and promote better respect for international law. According to the guidelines, a working
definition of nonstate armed groups is:

      The UN document explicates critical concepts that frame successful negotiation and reconciliation
approaches. These include motivations for entering into negotiations, tips for

knowing when to adopt amore cautious approach to negotiations, humanitarian partners
in negotiations, international law relevant to humanitarian negotiations, possible negative
implications of humanitarian negotiations, and suggestions for dealing with noncompliance.
The guidelines conclude with a worksheet for mapping characteristics of
armed groups. These guidelines have an 88-page partner UN publication, Humanitarian
Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners, which is available online at www
.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ruri-6lksa9.

The future is full of uncertainty and the implications are grave for national security. As
the editor of this comprehensive work, I encourage the reader to delve into these chapters
and discover elements of wisdom for dealing with worldwide unrest. Globalization
and interconnectedness will fuel discontent in some regions while dissuading disputes in
others. Armed groups are merely one vestige of mankind’s struggles in an increasingly
smaller world.
      The highest calling of selfless service is protecting those who will be victimized by
conflict and violence. Prevention of hostilities or rapid resolution thereof demands new
solutions. Consequently, we must start thinking about tomorrow’s challenges today.
George Will, the Pulitzer Prize–winning author and political scientist, said, “The future
has a way of arriving unannounced.” The purpose of this volume is to prepare ourselves
for when we discover, unexpectedly, that the future is here.